I brought up the university/academy because you did…but regardless, no European of the period or after had any problem with any of the things you mentioned were relevant to Vauban’s career.

The idea that systemic security pressures force states to emulate others or be eliminated is pure neorealism, evident in Waltz’s Theory of International Politics and, before that, in his ’62 Daedalus article. And it’s tired because, frankly, realism is all but dead as an academic theory–all the realists have become neo-classical realists, interested in domestic politics, and as such tacit liberal theorists. But let’s also be clear–North and Weingast are in fact not young or even middle-aged men, and I have no problem calling ideas from decades ago old, and perhaps even tired. Certainly I think a lot of W & N’s ideas about the emergence of domestic political institutions are bad history, if perhaps too-neat theory.

Note that I mentioned Ibsen because he was a product of a culture which, even a hundred and fifty years after Sweden had quit the race for power, was _still_ deeply pietistic.

It does not matter where Vauban studied, the fact remains that he did learn geometry, science, and mathematics and that his education provided him with the toolkit to reinvent siege warfare.

Frankly, I find your fixation with the academy silly.

It does not matter whether states expand or contract, attack or defend. It’s all war. In fact, Clausewitz argued that defense is the essence of war for the aggressor would like to take over our country entirely peacefully.

As for Ibsen, he was not even born until after Sweden had been relegated to the periphery of Europe. Had Sweden still played a role in European power politics, he might not have had to content with a backwards church.

Finally, Robert Bates is not a neo-realist. Nor are Weingast or Douglass North. In fact, it strikes me as odd to accuse a nobel price winner of being old and tired.

You might be right, TMD, but you will have to come up with more than name calling to stick that label to people that are recognized worldwide as rationalists.

II. I have strong doubts that states who adopt a largely defensive posture (SW, NL) and who encountered few wars over two centuries can usefully be considered national security states, wherein the pressures to emulate the most advanced states over-ride everything. This seems to be not more than the tired old neorealist rag. While its true that the armed neutrals have very good defenses, it also seems to be the case that they wear their defenses quite likely. In Switzerland, for example, they have never been able to force a change to a strong state model, or indeed even of a centralized state, unlike the rest of the continent. Surely we should expect government institutions to become more efficient and tailored to the situation before significant and often difficult cultural changes are made? (While the FRG is not centralized in the traditional sense, it is certainly a ‘strong state,’ thanks to its Prussian inheiritance.)

III. Among the state churches, Sweden’s was among the most Pietistic, for the longest. The relatively closed and deeply moralistic society it promoted was, after all, what Ibsen was reacting against. It was only once unions and social democrats, who opposed the authority of the church (which had often opposed them), rose to power that the Swedish lutherans changed–in good part because the politicians used the states controls over the church to make changes in the church. (For instance, it was Parliament that in 1958 decreed that women would be employed as clergy in the church–which then led to their ordinations the next year.) In this sense, much of it’s character, and the resulting nature of religious discourse within the country, was decisively shaped by the domestic struggle for power–rather than an internationalized struggle for power. This is certainly true in the protestant states; and by the end of the 17th century, the catholic church’s hierarchy is already beyond a literalism that would have influenced the scientific research of the age.

I think the biggest problem of the Enlightenment is that it all too often leads to the hammer/nail problem. When all you have is a hammer everything appears a nail.

Of course I’m not suggesting this is being done to an extreme level. (After all look at all the discussion of Islamic traditions in the thread – something I know little about and thus won’t comment on)

In any case while it would be impossible to deny the role the Enlightenment (and the rise of hermeneutics as a formal discipline) plays in Biblical literalism, I think one should also realize that there is a definite non-Enlightenment aspect to this. I’d suggest that the key facets of fundamentalism are much more a throwback to pre-Enlightenment utopia schemes rather than schemes best understood in terms of the Enlightenment.

After Poltava, Sweden needed to defend its Pomeranian possessions, participated in the armed neutrality, and eventually joined Russia and the German powers in fighting Napoleon. Likewise, after the War of the Spanish Succession the Dutch Republic remained under threat from France and other powers. Eventually, it was taken over by the French Republic.

If Europe was not at war then there was the threat of war.

The possibility of war shapes states as profoundly as the presence of war. Small countries in Europe, like Sweden and the Dutch Republic, were constantly threatened by bigger neighbors and had to defend its colonial possessions against other European powers. Likewise, the big powers were in intense competition with one another.

Although Sweden has not participated actively in a war since 1815, Sweden remains one of the best armed nations in the world. Only Sweden and Switzerland can actually shelter their entire population against weapon of mass destruction exposure.

I also think that you are underestimating the importance of the academy. The crown depended on personnel educated at universities. Just because the state of education was not impressive by today’s standards that does not mean that it wasn’t a big deal back in the day.

The princes certainly understood the importance of their universities in the context of their security and mercantilist policies. For purposes of illustration, you might want to read about the French philosopher and fortress engineer Vauban.

For the theory, I recommend Robert Bates’s short little book Prosperity and Violence.

The fact remains that European powers do not allow religious fundamentalists to poison public debate with irrational and literalist nonsense. The reason is not the church state. The church state has been the tool to marginalize the fundamentalists (in that sense Harris is entirely wrong about his accusation that religious moderates . The purpose is the welfare of the state.

In terms of protecting the academy from religion, really, I’m not at all sure how this would relate to the external security threats of the day. Remember that 18th Century Oxford and Cambridge and Edinburgh were little more than seminaries for the C of E, or finishing schools for gentlemen, who rarely attended their classes (indeed, only Edinburgh had a distinguished faculty, but its strength was really in philosophy and econ, things that at that time were far from a juncture of religion and national security)–and it’s hard to see direct relationships between research there and policy.

I’m all for 2nd image-reversed explanations, but knowing the history of the time, your whole line of argument makes no sense.

Contrary to your impression, I am very much aware of the egalitarian impulse of religious movements during the eighteenth century, hence their emphasis on education.

However, the commitment to reason and education had to take a back seat for fundamentalist movements when Biblical literalism was not rationally sustainable any longer.

As for the state churches, they could have been more fundamentalist and literalist themselves.

Instead rulers chose to shield the academy from religious intrusion. In an intensely competitive inter-state environment, it would have been disadvantageous to continue the religious supremacy over printing, teaching, and research.

Remember that during the seventeenth century, printing presses in France and England were tightly controlled by the state churches. During the eighteenth and nineteenth century that became impossible, mostly because of acute and potential inter-state war.

That is especially obvious in the British and the Prussian cases.